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REAL PROPERTY SURVEY
INTRODUCTION

During 1993, the Tenth Circuit considered few traditional real property issues.1 This Survey addresses three divergent cases, Buzzard v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, Honce v. Vigi4 and Board of County Commissioners
2
for Garfield County v. WH.L, Inc. In Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
the Tenth Circuit addressed the ongoing problem of defining the limits of
s
state taxing authority of Indian tribes and their activities. Honce v. Vigil
defined the proper standards for sexual harassment in the context of a
claim under the Fair Housing Act.4 Board of County Commissionersfor Garfield County v. WH.L, Inc.,5 a traditional property case, involved determining when a statute of limitations begins to run in circumstances where the
public claims ownership of a road by adverse possession.
I.

LIMITNG THE MEANING OF "INDIAN COUNTRY"

6

IN STATE TAX CASES

The limits of a state's power to tax Indian tribes and their activities is
an issue that has faced the courts for some time because there has never
been a set policy controlling state taxation of Indians. 7 The rules vary
depending on who is taxed, what is taxed, and where the taxed property is
located. This section discusses the sovereignty and taxation of Indian
tribes.
A.

Background
1. Sovereignty of Indian Tribes

The law applicable to Indians is a specialized area of law with principles generally irrelevant to the core of property law.8 At the same time,
some principles of Indian law, such as sovereignty, apply to property law.
Sovereignty, in the sense it is used to mean the power to rule one's own
1. Perhaps the most interesting case decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey
period impacting property was United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). The court held that Colorado could enforce its law independent of the federal government's enforcement of a CERCLA action. For a detailed
commentary on this case see Alana Bissonnette, Comment, Clean Up Your Federal Mess in My
State: Colorado Has a State RCRA-Voice at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 257
(1994).
2. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 555 (1993).
3. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. The author realizes that the term "Indian country" may be considered insensitive
and, thus, offensive by some. However, since "Indian country" is the term that is, and has
been, used in statutes, case law, and articles on the subject, it will be used throughout this
Survey for consistency.
7. Keith E. Whitson, Note, StateJurisdiction to Tax Indian Reservation Land and Activities,

44 WASH. U. J. UR.. & CoNTMP. L. 99, 122 (1993).
8. SeeJoseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,51 (1991).
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property, is one of the biggest of the "sticks in the bundle" that make up
traditional property rights.
The general rule of tribal sovereignty is that tribes remain subject to
the superior sovereignty of the United States government. 9 In practice,
tribes enjoy the right to self-governance, 10 subject to limitations that may
1
be set by Congress.
Tribal sovereignty does not extend outside the boundaries of tribal
lands but is divested to the extent that it involves external relations. 12 Tribal sovereignty may also be divested in relation to lands within the boundaries of a reservation owned by an individual in fee simple. A tribe may,
however, have regulatory power over a fee owner if he threatens the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.' 3 The
tribe's regulatory power extends only to circumstances that impinge on
the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
tribe. 14 It must also be shown that the activity regulated has a serious impact on the tribe's interests. 15
Congress muddied the waters of Indian sovereignty with the Indian
General Allotment Act of 1887 ("Dawes Act")' 6 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.17 The Dawes Act was intended to assimilate the Indians into society by splitting up the reservations and allotting the land to
individual Indians. 18 The federal government was to hold the land allotted to individual Indians in trust for twenty-five years to ensure that the
Indians were not disadvantaged. 19 The Indian Reorganization Act ended
the process by stating that after June 18, 1934, no land from an Indian
reservation could be allotted to any Indian.20 The allotment process
ended when the government realized that the goal of assimilating tribal
members into society was not being reached. 21 The Indian Reorganization Act also extended the duration of the trusts created by the Dawes Act
until such time as Congress directed that the trusts be discontinued. 22 By
9. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 245 (Rennard Strickland et al.,
eds., 1982).
10. Janice Brandt, Note, Indian Sovereignty-Beyond the "Well Pleaded Complaint Rule," 15
T. MARSHALL L. REv. 169, 178 (1989-90).

11. Stacy L. Cook, Comment, Indian Sovereignty: State Tax Collection on IndianSales to Nontribal Members-States Have a Right Without a Remedy [Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatome Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 111 S.Ct.905 (1991)], 31 WASHBuRN L.J. 130,
132 (1991).
12. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 425-26 (1989).

13. Id. at 428.
14. Id. at 429.
15. Id. at 431.
16. Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34,
339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
17. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
18. Singer, supra note 8, at 9.
19. 25 U.S.C. § 348.
20. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
21. J. Bart Wright, Note, Tribes v.States: Zoning Indian Reservations, 32 NAT. REsouRcEsJ.
195, 198 (1992).

22. 25 U.S.C. § 462.
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the time the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was enacted, almost twothirds of the reservation land in the United States had been allotted to
23
individuals.
Because of the Dawes Act and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
land that was once part of Indian reservations is now held in a variety of
ways. First, various Indian tribes still own reservation land. Second, individual Indians own some land that is held in trust for them by the government. Third, individuals-both Indians and non-Indians-own land in
fee simple within the boundaries of reservations. These varied forms of
land ownership within Indian reservations create a checkerboard ownership of land-the crux of many problems in determining Indian sovereignty.2 4

The difficulty of determining which sovereign power has

authority over the various types of land occurs in many cases that involve
25
Indians, and is often the determinative factor in a given case.
2.

Indian Country

The benchmark for allocating authority over Indians and Indian land
is whether the land has been classified as "Indian country. '2 6 Although
the concept of Indian country was originally used to determine jurisdiction in the criminal context,2 7 courts have also used the concept to deter28
mine jurisdiction in civil matters including taxation.
Though the definition of Indian country seems fairly clear, courts
have extended the determination of Indian country beyond the words of
the statute. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has given further direction on what test to use to determine whether a given piece of property is
Indian country. The bottom-line test is whether the land has been validly
set aside by the federal government for the use of Indians under the super23. Singer, supra note 8, at 9.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989). Brendale was a zoning case involving whether the tribe or the county
had the power to zone specific lands. The different rulings depended on where on the reservation the land was located. The case involved two parcels of land. One was within the
"closed" area of the reservation, which is closed to the general public. The Court held that
the tribe, not the county, had the authority to zone this land. The other parcel was within
the "open" area of the reservation. The Court held that this land could be zoned by the
county. Id.
26. Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term
"Indian country", as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
28. Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 973.
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intendence of the government.2 9 The Tenth Circuit held that a formal
designation of land-as a "reservation" is not required for the land to be
Indian country.3 0 Nor is patented fee title ownership an obstacle to finding a given piece of land to be Indian country, regardless of whether the
31
fee is owned by an Indian, the tribe, or a non-Indian.
Despite some direction provided by the courts, problems still arise in
determining what land is Indian country. Issues include whether the
property is either a "dependent Indian community," or not Indian country
at all. The Tenth Circuit held that to determine whether a given property
is a dependent Indian community, the court must look at the nature of
the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to the
Indian tribe and to the federal government, and the established practice
of government agencies toward the area.32 The Tenth Circuit left some
room to the lower courts by holding that they could look at other relevant
factors to determine whether a given property is a dependent Indian community but did not elaborate on what those other factors might be.3 3 The
court also held that a group of Indians present in one community does
34
not, by itself, establish that area as a dependent Indian community.
3.

The Tax Cases

In an effort to develop consistent standards, courts have experimented with varied tests for resolving the inherent tension between shielding Indians from excessive interference and reserving some amount of
regulatory control for the state. The three most common tests include:
(1) the federal instrumentality test; (2) the infringement on sovereignty
35
test; and (3) preemption analysis.
The federal instrumentality test is based on a simple premise that because Indian tribes are instrumentalities of the federal government, they,
like the government, are exempt from state taxation without express authority.36 The infringement on sovereignty test balances the state's authority to tax Indians against infringement on the Indians' right to selfgovernance.3 7 Under preemption analysis, Indians are exempt from state
29. Citizen Band Potawatome Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d
1303, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
30. Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 973.
31. Id. at 975. See also Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205, 207 (10th Cir. 1964) (holding that the words "notwithstanding the issue of any patent" in § 1151 refer to any patent,
regardless of to whom it was issued).
32. United States v. Martinez, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Sandoval and
United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876)).
33. Id. at 1024.
34. Id.
35. Whitson, supra note 7, at 105-19.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 106-07. This test provided more authority to the states to govern off-reservation activities than the "instrumentality" test, but this test was soon abandoned by the Court.
Id.
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taxation only when Congress has clearly stated such an intent.3 8 The general rule of construction used by courts is that statutory ambiguities should
be construed in favor of the Indians.3 9 Courts continue to use variations
40
of these tests.
There are two presumptions made about state taxation of tribal activities. First, state taxation of tribal activities on reservations is invalid. 41 The
second presumption is the converse: state taxation of tribal activities off
the reservation is presumably valid. 4 2 The analysis of a given tax is not as
simple as determining whether it taxes an on- or off-reservation activity,
because the federal government has plenary authority over Indian affairs
43
and may authorize state taxation on both tribes and individual Indians.
The United States Supreme Court recently held that without express congressional authority, a state cannot tax activities that are in Indian country. 44 This is because the aforementioned presumption applies not only to
formal reservations, but to all Indian country.
There are some clear rules in the context of state taxation of Indian
activities. A state can tax nontribal members with whom the tribe does
business as long as the tax falls on the nonmember rather than on the
tribe. 45 The state can also tax residents of the reservation who are not
members of the tribe. 46 Regardless of whether the tribe also imposes a
tax, there is no effect on, or preemption of, valid state taxation on non47
members of the tribe.
In the context of cigarette shops on reservations, the Supreme Court
held that states cannot tax sales to tribal members. 4 8 Although the state
can tax sales of cigarettes made by tribal smokeshops to nontribal members, states may encounter difficulties with tax revenue collection. The
Court previously held that states may put minimal burdens on tribes to
collect the taxes from nontribal members. 49 Despite the fact that individual tribe members have no specific immunity from lawsuit by the state,
Indian tribes have immunity, and states cannot use their courts to collect
such taxes. 50 The Court instead provided a list of alternative means of
38. Id at 108. Preemption analysis was a creation of the Burger Court, now replaced by
the infringement on sovereignty test.

39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)
(using both preemption analysis and the infringement on sovereignty tests to invalidate a
state tax on Indian activities), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
41. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536, 1538 (5th Cir. 1992).
42. Id.

43. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985).
44. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1992 (1993).
45. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
46. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
161 (1980).
47. Id. at 158.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425

U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
50. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1046

[Vol. 71:4

collection the state may use. 5 1 Controversy is the natural by-product of
52
granting a right without a remedy.
B.

53
Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commission

1.

Facts

In Buzzard, the State of Oklahoma taxed the sales of smokeshops
owned and operated by the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
("UKB").54 The smokeshops were located on land purchased and owned
in fee simple by the tribe. The land was subject to a restriction on alienation because the tribal charter prevented the tribe from conveying the
land without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 55 The tribe
sought an injunction to prohibit the state from enforcing its state tobacco
taxing statute against the tribe.5 6 Upholding the application of the statnot
ute, the trial court held that the restriction against alienation did
57
make the land involved fit within the definition of Indian country.
2.

Opinion

The court began its opinion by discussing the statute that originally
defined Indian country. 58 The court then distinguished United States v.
McGowan,59 which found land to be an Indian colony because it had been
set aside by the government for the use of Indians and because the government purchased the land for needy Indians.6 0 This was not the case in
Buzzard. The next step in the Buzzard court's analysis was a discussion of
trust land. The court determined that when the government holds land in
trust it holds title to the land and has thus acted to show its intent to exert
jurisdiction over the land.6 1 Although the government must act in order
for UKB to sell the land in question, that fact does not, by itself, indicate
that the government intended the land to be set aside for the tribe.
The court next considered the effects of holding the land to be Indian country. 6 2 The court stated that if the land were Indian country, it
51. Id The suggested alternatives include: collection of the tax from cigarette wholesalers, seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, and entering into agreements with the
tribe to adopt a system for collecting the tax. Id.
52. See Cook, supra note 11.
53. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
54. Id. at 1075.

55. Id. The tribe also claimed that 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) restricted
the sale of their land without prior government approval. 25 U.S.C. § 177 prevents any conveyance of land from the Indians from being valid in the absence of a treaty. There is case
law holding that the statute applies to all Indian land regardless of whether it is classified as
Indian country. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

452 U.S. 968 (1981). The court in Buzzard did not reach this issue because of its disposition
of the other issues in the case. Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1077.
56. Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1075.
57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

18 U.S.C. § 1151. For text of statute see supra note 27.
302 U.S. 535 (1938).
Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1076.
Id.
Id.
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would mean that any land UKB purchased would be Indian country, forcing the federal government to assert criminal and civil jurisdiction over
that land. The court further held that nothing in the case law allowed
Indian tribes the unilateral power to create Indian country. 63 The court
concluded that the land in question was not Indian country despite the
restraint on alienation. 64 By finding that the land was not Indian country,
the court upheld Oklahoma's power to tax the smokeshops.
C.

Analysis

The analysis of whether property is Indian country is fact specific and
should take into account the current climate and situation of Indian
tribes. 6 5 Courts should consider the purposes behind reserving jurisdiction over Indian country to the tribes or the federal government. One
purpose beneficial to the tribes is preservation of important tribal attributes, including domestic relations, economic development, and tribal
customs.

66

Important issues arise when states tax the activities of Indian tribes.
State taxation may impinge on the tribe's sovereignty. Additionally, tribal
economies may depend on tax exemptions. Federal impingement on tribal sovereignty may violate the federal policy of fostering Indian development. Adding state taxation to an existing federal taxation scheme leads
67
to double taxation where both the tribe and the state tax the same sale.
Prohibiting state taxation of Indian tribes may grant an unfair competitive advantage to Indians. 68 Refusing states the right to tax Indians
denies the states valuable revenues, 69 and discriminates in that it treats
70
one group of United States citizens differently due to their heritage.
Given that the tax levied in Buzzard did not impinge the integrity of
the tribe, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the land was not Indian
country and was, therefore, subject to taxation by the state. The land simply did not fit any of the defined types of property considered Indian
71
country.
The effect of Buzzard is that a tribe cannot expand its tax-exempt
boundaries by purchasing land in fee simple and adding it to Indian country. The ruling does not affect the tax-exempt status of property within
the definition of Indian country. Any sales made to tribal members on
those lands are not subject to state taxation. Since it is not the policy of
72
federal Indian law to authorize Indian tribes to market tax exemptions,
63. 1d&at 1077.
64. Id.
65. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 537-38.
66. Wright, supra note 21, at 199.
67. Whitson, supra note 7, at 125-26.
68. Id. at 127-28.
69. 1& at 129.
70. Id at 129-30.
71. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
72. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
155 (1980).
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but to foster development, allowing the tax does not contradict federal
policy.
Additionally, this decision does not directly impact the economic development of the tribes. If the land purchased by the tribe is considered
Indian country, the effect would be that all sales except those to tribal
members would be taxable. The only difference is that, due to this decision, the state may tax sales to members of the tribe.
Because the Tenth Circuit did not recognize the land at issue as Indian Country, the tribe may not tax activities on the land. Thus, if the
tribe's economy depends on tax revenues generated on land obtained by
purchase, there will be a negative impact. The Buzzard decision does not
offend Indian development policy because the tribe may locate the store
on land considered Indian country, thereby exempting tribal members
from taxes.
It should also be noted that the state supports the land that the Indians purchased in fee simple, just as it does any other landowner's land, by
providing services such as road maintenance. It would be unfair to deny
the state the ability to collect revenues to pay for the support of Indianowned land. Further, a holding contrary to Buzzard would be discriminatory by allowing the Indians a benefit not given to others when their land
is no different than that of any other landowner.
D.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Buzzard comports with prior case law
on Indian country and does not substantially detriment the Indians.
While the United States should foster economic development by Indian
tribes, it should not do so by discriminating in favor of the tribes at the
expense of the states.
II.

USING EMPLOYMENT LAW PRINCIPLES IN HOUSING

In Honce v. Vigi47 3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied employment law principles to find that a landlord did not sexually harass a
tenant. 74 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit joined relatively few courts in
75
creating specific rules for sexual harassment in the field of housing law.
This section discusses the law applicable to sexual harassment in the fields
of employment law and housing law, as well as the liability of the harasser's
employer or the owner of the property.

73. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 1090.
75. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
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Background
1. Employment Cases

There is no longer any question that sexual harassment is actionable
sexual discrimination. 76 There are two types of sexual harassment cases,
"quid pro quo" and "hostile environment." 77 Problems arise when attempting to define what conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment.
As a threshold matter, to constitute harassment, the conduct must be
that which would not occur but for the sex of the employee. 78 In a hostile
environment claim, the conduct must also be sufficiently severe so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. 79 To determine whether an illegal condition has been created,
courts examine the "totality of the circumstances." 80 It is not enough to
8
show casual or isolated manifestations of discrimination. '
Whether a hostile environment exists is very fact specific. The United
States Supreme Court recently provided a list of factors to determine
whether an environment is hostile.8 2 The factors include: "the frequency
of the conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance."8 3 The alleged harm that the conduct has on an employee's psychological state is one relevant factor, but is
84
not dispositive in determining whether a hostile environment exists.
Two other general rules are important in sexual harassment claims in
employment cases. First, in hostile environment cases, the concern is with
the general work atmosphere and, therefore, conduct directed at another
person that affects the atmosphere is relevant to the case. 8 5 Second, for
either type of sexual harassment claim, it is not necessary to show an economic or tangible injury in order to recover. 86 The harm that must be
87
shown is that a reasonable person perceives the environment as hostile.
In Henson v. City of Dundee,88 the Eleventh Circuit found a valid sexual
harassment cause of action based on a hostile work environment when the
plaintiff was subjected to demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities during her employment, as well as to repeated requests from a supervisor to
engage in sexual activities. 8 9 The supervisor also engaged in other activi76. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). For further explanation of hostile environment claims
see infra text accompanying notes 78-88. For further explanation of quid pro quo cases see
infra text accompanying notes 92-100.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413.
I& at 1414.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
1d.
Id.
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406; 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 899.
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ties such as following the employee to the rest room, exposing himself,
fondling the employee in front of other employees, and even sexually assaulting the employee. 90 The Supreme Court, in MeritorSavings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson,9 1 found a valid claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile
environment when the employee voluntarily engaged in sexual relations
with a supervisor because she feared losing her job.
In addition to claims of sexual harassment based on the creation of a
hostile environment, there are also claims based on a quid pro quo request. Quid pro quo involves an employer asking an employee to engage
in sexual activity in exchange for certain benefits of employment, such as
obtaining a job or a promotion, or in exchange for the continuation of
benefits. 92 The test for whether a sexual request to an employee is dis-

criminatory is whether the request was unwelcome to the employee, not

93
whether the employee voluntarily engaged in sexual activity.

a.

ProofElements

In a sexual harassment case based on hostile environment, the plaintiff must allege and prove three elements. 94 The first element requires the
plaintiff to be a member of a protected class. This simply requires a stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman. 95 The second element is
that the employee was subjected to unwelcome conduct constituting sexual harassment. 96 The third element is that the harassment was based
upon sex. 9 7 The harassment cannot be directed at both women and men
because in such a case, the harassment is not based upon gender. 98
The elements necessary to prove a quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim are similar to those for hostile environment claims. The difference
is the addition of a fourth element: the acceptance or rejection of the
harassment must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of ajob
benefit, or the cause of a denial of a job benefit. 99
b.

Procedure

The procedure in a sexual harassment case is somewhat confusing.
The plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie discrimination case. 10 0 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case, the burden moves to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory act. 1 1 The plain90.
91.
92.
93.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
447 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
Meritor,447 U.S. at 68.

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id. at 904.
Id. at 909.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id.
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tiff may attempt to prove that the defendant's articulated reasons are a
cover up, or pretext, for a discriminatory reason. 10 2 Confusion arises over
the court's role after the defendant has offered explanatory reasons. At
that point, the court must determine whether the action was discriminatory, not whether the defendant's given reason is truthful. 10 3 The
Supreme Court held it is not enough to disbelieve the defendant. The
existence of discrimination is a question of fact like any other. To find
that sexual harassment occurred, the plaintiff's explanation of intentional
10 4
discrimination must be more credible than the employer's explanation.
2.

Housing Cases

Attention to sexual harassment in the context of housing is relatively
recent. 10 5 The Fair Housing Act' 0 6 prohibits discrimination in housing
based on sex.' 0 7 The text of the Fair Housing Act is similar to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.108
Very few courts have ruled on the issue of sexual harassment in housing. This is unfortunate in light of the pervasiveness of such conduct. 109
The few cases, however, ruling on this issue offer guidance for defining
sexual harassment in the housing context.
102. Id. at 805.
103. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority increased the breadth of the evidence needed by a plaintiff. By requiring the plaintiff to be believed in order to prevail, the
dissent believed that the majority was requiring plaintiffs to disprove reasons for the firing
never articulated by the defendant. Before this decision, a plaintiff could prevail based solely
on a prima facie case coupled with disbelief of the defendant's articulated reasons for fiing
the plaintiff. Id. at 2753.
104. Id. at 2754.
105. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. Rav. 1061 (providing a survey of the limited case law in the area and a
statistical analysis of the incidence of sexual harassment in housing).
106. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act is also
referred to as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
107. Id. § 3604. The Fair Housing Act, in relevant part, reads:
[I] t shall be unlawful
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... sex ....
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of ... sex ....
Id. It is further prohibited to:
[C]oerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyments of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right
granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
Id. § 3617.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The act makes it unlawful to
discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex." Id The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 is part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended.
109. See Cahan, supra note 105, at 1066. Of 87 housing centers that gave complete answers to Cahan's survey, 57 centers (65%) reported that they received complaints of sexual
harassment. Id.
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In New York v. Merlino,"s0 the court implied that sexual harassment is
actionable under the Fair Housing Act.'11 The court relied on MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 11 2 but did not explicitly adopt employment sexual
harassment law to govern sexual harassment in the housing context because there was a question of whether the statute of limitations barred the
113

claim.

Shellhammer v. Lewallen was the first case to apply sexual harassment
concepts in the housing context.1 1 4 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Ohio held that the sexual harassment doctrine developed in employment law applies to housing claims.1 15 Shellhammerrecognized both hostile environment and quid pro quo (conditioned
tenancy) claims. The court held that a hostile environment claim requires
the plaintiff to show "pervasive and persistent" offensive conduct by the
landlord.1 1 6 If the plaintiff establishes persistent conduct, its effect, ac117
cording to the court, should be examined under a subjective standard.
The court reasoned that liability should not be defeated solely because a
reasonable person might have reacted differently to the landlord's conduct than did the plaintiff.1 18
In Griegerv. Sheets, 11 9 the court recognized both hostile environment
claims and quid pro quo claims as actionable sexual harassment under the
Fair Housing Act. As in employment cases, a sexual harassment claim
under the Fair Housing Act does not have to include a tangible injury.
Additionally, there need not be a loss of housing in order to support such
120
a claim.
To support a sexual harassment claim based on hostile environment,
the plaintiff must show extensive sexual harassment that made his or her
tenancy burdensome and significantly less desirable than it would have
been in the absence of the harassment.12 1 Furthermore, conduct that is
not of a strictly sexual nature can support a sexual harassment claim if the
122
conduct would not have occurred but for the gender of the harassee.
To establish a quid pro quo or conditioned tenancy claim, a plaintiff
must show either: (1) that the landlord conditioned the terms, conditions,
110. 694 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The plaintiffs alleged that Merlino had a pattern
of sexual harassment, unwanted touching, and propositions directed toward female customers for housing.
111. Id. at 1104.
112. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 76-79.

113. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1102.
1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 15,472 (W.D. Ohio, Nov. 22, 1983).
115. d.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. No. 87-C-6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In Gsieger the landlord
stopped making needed repairs to the property because his sexual advances were rejected.
Id. at *I.
120. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1104.
121. Gfieger, 1989 WL 38707 at *2.
122. Id. at *3.
114.
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123
or privileges of housing on the plaintiff's submission to sexual requests;
or, (2) that the landlord deprived the plaintiff of terms, conditions, or
privileges of tenancy because the plaintiff did not submit to sexual requests. 12 4 The plaintiff need not show that repeated sexual requests occurred. 125 It is explicitly illegal to condition the granting of housing
services based on whether the person submits to sexual requests. 126

Courts have adopted many sexual harassment principles from employment law and applied them in the housing context. Due to the similarity between Title VI (the Equal Employment Opportunity Act), and
Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, this is
logical. Not only is the language very similar,1 27 but the two statutes share
128
the same purpose: ending discrimination.
3.

Third Party Liability

The liability of third parties in sexual harassment claims in the employment context is uncertain. It is clear, however, that employers are not
strictly liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by their employees. 129 Rather, courts apply agency principles to determine the liability of
employers. 130 The problem with applying agency principles is that agency
cases are very fact specific and consequently no clear rule addressing this
issue emerges.
Courts have also applied agency law to determine liability in the housing context.' 3 1 However, in the housing context, the principal is, in most
cases, liable for discriminatory treatment of customers by his agent because the agent is usually within the scope of his or her employment during the time the agent has contact with the harassed person.' 3 2 While
situations may exist in the housing context where the agent acts outside of
the scope of employment, it appears that they tend to occur less frequently
than in the employment context.

123. Id

124. ld
125. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 115,472 (W.D. Ohio, Nov.
22, 1983).
126. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (5) (1993). The relevant part of the regulation reads: "Prohibited actions under this section include, but are not limited to: ... (5) Denying or limiting
services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling, because a person
failed or refused to provide sexual favors." Id.
127. See supra notes 106-08.
128. See, e.g., Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1104 (recognizing that the two statutes are "part of a
coordinated scheme" to end discrimination).
129. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Meritor,477
U.S. at 72).
130. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 72.
131. Mart v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1974) (FHA case based on racial
discrimination).
132. Id at 741.
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Honce v. Vigil' 3 3
1.

Facts

In August 1990, Ms. Honce arranged to rent a lot in a mobile home
park owned and operated by Mr. Vigil. Before Ms. Honce took possession
of the lot Mr. Vigil asked her out socially on three occasions.' 3 4 Mr. Vigil
asked her to accompany him to a religious seminar, the state fair, and to
visit some property. Each time Ms. Honce refused. 135 Before Ms. Honce
moved in, Mr. Vigil asked when she would go out with him. Ms. Honce
replied that she did not wish to go out with him at all. Both parties agreed
that Mr. Vigil never used profanity or made sexual advances or
36
requests.1
After Ms. Honce moved her trailer to the lot, she and Mr. Vigil had
several disputes. One dispute involved a plumbing problem for which Mr.
37
AnVigil refused to pay because the problem was not in his sewer line.'
other confrontation involved paving stones that Mr. Vigil supplied to all
138
the tenants, and which Ms. Honce did not want to use.
The principal dispute between Mr. Vigil and Ms. Honce involved a
fence that Ms. Honce was building around a dog run. Mr. Vigil came
upon workmen building the fence and using concrete. Mr. Vigil had a
policy that forbade the use of concrete, and he preferred that his tenants
use fencing materials supplied by him. 139 The fence incident led to a
shouting match between Ms. Honce and Mr. Vigil during which he
threatened to evict her. Immediately thereafter, Ms. Honce went to the
140
sheriff for advice and left the trailer park the next day.
Ms. Honce brought an action against Mr. Vigil, claiming violations of
the Fair Housing Act based on sexual harassment and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 14 1 At trial, other people from the trailer park
testified that they had similar problems with Mr. Vigil. One couple testified that they also had problems involving a dog run and an argument
over paving stones. Additionally, they testified that Mr. Vigil yelled at
them because they did not attend a Bible study class with him. These ten142
ants also moved out.
After the presentation of her case, the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico granted judgment as a matter of law for Mr.
143
Vigil on all claims. Ms. Honce appealed.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1087.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1087.
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Majority Opinion

The Tenth Circuit began its opinion by expressly adopting the principles of employment discrimination in order to decide the housing
claim. 144 Citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 145 the court held that Ms.
Honce failed to prove a prima facie case of disparate treatment because
146
she did not prove that Mr. Vigil treated women differently than men.
The court then addressed the issue of quid pro quo sexual harassment. The court found that Ms. Honce did not have a quid pro quo claim
because Mr. Vigil never made any threat based upon sexual favors.
Although Ms. Honce contended that the threat was implicit, she did not
provide any evidence of a connection between Mr. Vigil's actions and her
1 47
rejection of his social advances.
The court next turned to Ms. Honce's claim of sexual harassment
based on a hostile housing environment. The court used the Meritorstandards for hostile environment 48 to determine what constitutes a hostile
environment in the housing context. 14 9 The court determined that Ms.
Honce did not have a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile housing
environment because the offensive behavior did not include sexual remarks, requests for sexual favors, physical touching, or threats of violence.
Additionally, the court found that Mr. Vigil treated tenants of both sexes
alike. 150 In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Ms. Honce did not state claims sufficient to allow a reasonable
151
jury to find for her.
3.

Dissenting Opinion

Judge Seymour dissented from the majority's findings, disagreeing
with the majority's holding that Ms. Honce did not offer sufficient evidence to raise ajury question on her claims.' 5 2 Although she agreed that
employment discrimination principles should be used to assess a discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act, she argued the majority misap53
plied the law.'
Judge Seymour based her dissent on an underlying characterization
of the facts that differed from the majority's. On the disparate treatment
claim, she found that the evidence on the treatment of Ms. Honce's neighbors, as well as Mr. Vigil's assertion that he was the victim of a conspiracy
by women, justified trying the claim. 154 As to the quid pro quo claim,
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1088.
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089.
Id.
Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67-70.

149. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090.

150. d.
151. Id. at 1091. The court also addressed Ms. Honce's breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment claim, which is not discussed here. See id at 1090-91.

152. Id. at 1092 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1092-93.
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Judge Seymour held that the timing of Mr. Vigil's actions in asking for a
date raised a triable claim. Because Ms. Honce testified that Mr. Vigil's
treatment of her changed after she refused his requests for a date, Judge
Seymour argued that there was a valid jury question as to whether Mr.
Vigil's eviction threat was in retaliation for Ms. Honce's refusal to accept
his invitations. 155
Judge Seymour's strongest criticism involved the claim of a hostile
housing environment. Citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 156 she suggested
that the harassment itself need not be sexual in nature. Rather, the test is
whether it would have occurred regardless of the sex of the harassee.
Judge Seymour reasoned that Mr. Vigil's conspiracy belief and the testimony of the neighbors were evidence that the harassment might not have
occurred if Ms. Honce were male. In Judge Seymour's opinion, this gave
rise to a valid claim to be submitted to the jury.
C.

Analysis

Sexual harassment in housing disproportionately affects poor women
who cannot escape the harassment. 15 7 Courts should treat sexual harassment as seriously as other forms of discrimination. In the employment
context there may be an opportunity to escape the harassment, perhaps by
requesting a transfer. In the housing context, however, escape may be
more difficult, especially for the poor, due to the inherent problems of
finding a new place to live.
The use of employment law principles to address sexual harassment
in housing is sound because employment law provides proven standards
and rules. Additionally, employment and housing law share similar statutory schemes. Differences, however, exist between the housing and employment environments, including the relative ease of escaping an
offensive situation and the ability to use a formal complaint process to stop
the harassment. Courts should consider these characteristics when developing the law of sexual harassment in housing. Simple application of employment law doctrines to housing law will not result in the best law.
Courts should apply reasonable doctrines in the housing context, and develop new standards where employment law offers none.
There are two basic difficulties in defining sexual harassment. First, a
behavior might be sexual harassment or socially acceptable behavior depending on the circumstances. Second, there is a divergence between
male and female perceptions (and between different members of the
same gender) as to what constitutes sexual harassment. 158 Since the
United States Supreme Court recently suggested that the reasonable per155. Id. at 1094.
156. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
157. Cahan, supra note 105, at 1067. Obstacles include the costs of finding new housing
and the possibility of being blacklisted from housing that they can afford.
158. See Nancy Brown, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of
Hostile Wor*ing Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REV. 441, 449 (1988).
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son standard is correct to determine whether conduct is harassment,1 5 9
what is reasonable in an employment context may not be reasonable in
the housing context.
Unlike typical employee complaint procedures, no grievance procedure exists in the housing context. A large number of harassers could be
unintentionally and unknowingly harassing people and still be held liable
for that harassment, without a chance to modify their behavior. While this
is not a concern in egregious cases, it does neither the law nor society any
good to have the courts serve as the first source of relief. Legislatures
should develop procedures whereby a victim could deal with the supervisor of an alleged harasser to solve the problem outside of the court system.
If this is not possible, for example, if the harasser owns the property, or
the process fails, then the victim could resort to the courts.
The other major concern with adopting employment principles to
housing involves the use of agency principles to create vicarious liability.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, a renter or seller of real estate is almost always within the definition of scope of employment. 16° The
principal is subject to liability for the agent's behavior. 16 1 The problem
occurs when the renter or seller works for a company and not for the
owner of the property. In that case, liability could pass to the owner when
the rental agent is not within the owner's control, but is controlled by
another party, who is in turn controlled by the owners.
D.

Conclusion

The use of the sexual harassment employment law principles in housing law is valid. Courts and regulatory agencies should further develop the
law in this area. Problems unique in the housing context should be
scrutinized.
III.

ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ROADS BY THE GOVERNMENT

16 2
In Board of County Commissionersfor Garfield County v. WH.I., Inc.,
the Tenth Circuit held that the statute of limitations for adverse possession
of a road began to run when the road was incorrectly declared public.
The holding allowed the federal government to successfully claim the road
as a public highway. This section examines adverse possession and the
Tenth Circuit's decision, and suggests a separate doctrine of law that
would have allowed the road to be obtained for public use without waiting

twenty years.

A.

Background

This section discusses the Colorado law of adverse position at issue in
W.H.I. Colorado statutory law provides that a road over private land may
159. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. C. 367, 370 (1993).
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).

161. Id. § 219.
162. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
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be adversely possessed by the public.1 63 Colorado case law further refines
the doctrine of adverse possession as it applies to roads.
The general rule is that when a property owner constructs a passage
over his property at his own expense, the use of the passage by people
other than the owner is presumed permissive. 164 A permissive use continues to be permissive until the use is changed, with the knowledge of the
owner, to an adverse use.1 65 If the use remains permissive, the lapse of
166
time does not confer title by adverse possession to the user.
In order to prove adverse possession, the use must be actual, adverse
to the interests of the owner, hostile, and under a claim of right.1 67 The
use also must be open, notorious, and exclusive, and must continue for
the statutory period. 168 The statutory period does not begin to run until
the adverse claimant creates an exclusive right in herself by a clear, positive, and unequivocal act. 169 The adverse possessor may also fatally end
her adverse possession claim by acknowledging the title of the owner dur170
ing the adverse possession period.
The case law interpreting Colorado Revised Statute § 43-2-201 (1) (c)
retains the common law requirements of an adverse use, claim of right,
and a use continuing for the statutory period.1 7 1 The case law, however,
adds a requirement that the landowner had actual or implied knowledge
of the public's use of the road during the statutory period, and the owner
could not have objected to that use. 1 72 A party relying on section 43-2201 (1) (c) to prove adverse possession is aided by a presumption that the
use is adverse when the party shows that the use was for the prescribed
period of time. 173 However, the placement of a gate across the road to
obstruct free travel ordinarily makes the public use permissive. 174 The
75
permissiveness is not conclusive, however, and is fact specific.'
Recent case law has added a few variables to the adverse possession
equation. An unexplained use of an owner-constructed easement for the
statutory period is presumed to be under a claim of right and, therefore,
163. COLO. REv. STAT. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (1993). The statute provides:
(1) The following are declared to be public highways:
(c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive
years;...

Id.
164. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank of Arvada, 208 P.2d 935, 940 (Colo. 1949).
165. Id.
166. Segelke v. Atkins, 357 P.2d 636, 638 (Colo. 1960).

167. Id. at 637.
168. Id. In Colorado the statutory period for road easements is twenty years. CoLo. REv.
STAT. § 43-2-201 (1) (c)(1993).
169. Lovejoy v. School Dist. No. 46 of Sedgwick County, 269 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Colo.
1954).
170. Segelke, 357 P.2d at 638.
171. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Saguache v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975,
980 (Colo. 1984).
172. Id,
173. Id.
174. Id. at 981.
175. Id.
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apply when the land at issue is vacant, unadverse. 176 This rule does not
17 7
enclosed, and unoccupied.
B.

178
Board of County Commissionersfor Garfield County v. WH.I., Inc.

1.

Facts

Garfield County claimed that the public held a right of way established by adverse possession over the company's land. The road in ques179
tion crossed land owned by private landowners and the United States.
The county originally brought suit in the Garfield County District Court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.180 As a landowner, the United
States was originally a defendant in this action. However, the United
States believed that its interests were the same as those of the county and
removed the case to the federal courts, realigning itself as a plaintiff. 8 1
The United States and Garfield County, as co-plaintiffs, sought a declaration that the road was a public highway and requested an injunction to
restrain the private landowners from obstructing the road.' 8 2 The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the suit, holding that the United States and Garfield County failed to show a right to
18 3
relief. The United States appealed.
In 1929, the then owners of the defendant's land tried to have the
county declare the road in question a public road. The landowners at that
time petitioned the county for that purpose but did not correctly fill out
the petition.1 84 Disregarding the deficiency, the county passed a resolution, without objection by the owners, declaring the road a public highway
with the width extending twenty feet to either side of an unknown center
185
line.
In 1959, the then owner of the land in question, Buster Brown, requested that the county abandon the road. This request was refused and
Brown erected a gate across the roadway. The owners of the land have
186
obstructed the road since that time.
At trial, the county presented evidence that the road was used by the
public to access potato cellars, hike, hunt and fish, and collect mistletoe.
There was also testimony that the road had historically been a logging
176. Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).

177. Id.
178. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 1062.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1063. The United States had the same interest as the county because the road
led to national forest service land. As a result the United States removed the case to federal
court and realigned as a plaintiff, which made standing an issue. The appellate court held
that the United States had standing because the public would suffer injury if the road were
determined to be private. Id. at 1062-64.
182. Id. at 1063.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1065.
185. Id.
186. Id
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road.18 7 One witness, Mr. Jordan, testified that the land was not vacant
because there were homesteaders and a sawmill in the area. Mr. Jordan
also thought that there might have been fences in the area, but could not
be sure because, "they weren't important to me."188
2.

Opinion

The court cited section 43-2-201 (1) (c) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, and found there was evidence that the public used the roadway from
the time it was built through the date of the obstruction. 189 The landowners claimed the land was vacant, and thus the use was permissive, not adverse. The court rejected that claim on the basis that the resolution by the
Board of County Commissioners in 1929 put the owners on notice of the
adverse claim; thus, the statutory period started in 1929.190 The court so
held despite the fact that the petition asking for the resolution was incomplete and did not show the course of the roadway. 19 1 The court also noted
that there was evidence that the land was not vacant during the twenty-year
92
period.'
Next, the court addressed the fact that the exact path of the road is
not definite. The court stated that the road generally followed a wagon
road depicted in a 1893 plat. Further, the court held that the path of a
road may be altered without destroying the right of way. Additionally, the
landowners acquiesced in the use by the public even though the road
changed course. 193 The court concluded by holding that the public use
may have been adverse and remanded the case for a full hearing, directing
the district court to order the United States to undertake a survey to determine its exact path.
C.

Analysis

The court correctly held that the use of the road by the public may
have been adverse, since all of the elements of adverse possession were
met. 194 The conclusion is further bolstered by the finding in Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Saguache v. Flickinger.195 In Flickinger,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the county initially asserted the
public character of a road at the time it incorporated the road into the
county road system and that the statutory period for adverse possession
began to run at that time. 19 6 Further, it was not necessary for the court to
address the issue of the gate since the statutory period had run by the time
the gate was erected.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

I.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
687 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1984).
I.
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The owners of the land that the road crossed were not unfairly hurt
by the decision reached by the court because the statute requires the
owner to prohibit public use in order to maintain private use. 19 7 The state
has the power to condition ownership of land on the owner undertaking
such a minimal responsibility. 198 In addition, the owners had constructive
knowledge of the public use even though the recording document was
defective.
Although the doctrine of adverse possession allowed the county to
prevail in its claim, it only succeeded by virtue of the passage of at least
twenty years. There is another doctrine, the doctrine of dedication, that
could have been applied to keep the roadway public without the passage
of time. 199 Basically, a dedication involves the landowner voluntarily allowing her land to be used by the public. The doctrine of dedication
could have been used successfully in WH., but was not pleaded. The
doctrine of dedication would have permitted the county to prevail without
waiting twenty years. Usually, courts have used the doctrine of dedication
when the dedicated land involved commerce.2 0 0 The reasoning is that
dedication involves land becoming public and commerce is the most public activity. 20 1 In WH.L, the logging use was commerce, as well as hunting,
20 2
fishing, and access to the potato cellar if done commercially.
Dedication is the correct doctrine to apply to highways, although
courts have historically applied prescription (adverse possession).2°3 The
advantage of dedication, in a context similar to WH.L, is that it does not
depend on the passage of time.2 0 4 Dedication may be applied when it is
satisfactorily proven that the owner of the land intended to set it aside for
public use and the public has accepted the land.2 05 To have a dedication,
a clear manifestation of the landowner's intent to dedicate the land must
be shown.2 0 6 When the dedication is to the public, it does not depend on
the existence of a specific grantee; the public suffices, and actual acceptance is not required but may be implied. 20 7 After a dedication, the grantor is precluded from asserting an exclusive right over the land for as long
20 8
as it remains in public use.

In WH.L there was a dedication because the court found that the
landowners intended to set the road aside for the public use in 1929. The
dedication was complete even though the petition making the dedication
197.

Id. at 982.

198. Id. at 984.
199. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
/Pberty, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 711, 724 (1986).
200. Id. at 772.
201. Id. at 774.
202. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (some forms of commercial fishing
given the protection of the commerce clause).
203. SeeJOSEPH K. ANGELL & THOMAS DURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS § 131
(3d ed.) (1886).
204. Starr v. People, 30 P. 64, 66 (Colo. 1892).
205. Id. at 65.
206. ANGELL & DURFEE, supra note 203, § 142.

207. President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. 431, 436 (1832).
208. Id.
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was flawed. Because it was a dedication to the public it did not matter that
there was not a grantee. If dedication had been used, the issue of when
the statute of limitations began could have been avoided, allowing the
county to avoid a substantial hurdle at trial. Furthermore, because a grantor who dedicated land to the public has no right over that land as long as
it is used by the public, the roadway could have been used in perpetuity.
D.

Conclusion

While the doctrine of adverse possession was applied correctly in
W.H.L, there was a better doctrine available that was not used. By using
the doctrine of dedication, the government could have avoided addressing
when the statute of limitations began to run. This would have given the
public the use of the road and prevented any possibility of not having that
use.
CONCLUSION

During the survey period the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of issues that impact on real property. In Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,20 9 the court added to their long line of cases defining when a state
can tax the activities of Indian tribes. In Honce v. Vigil,2 10 the court took
an important step toward defining discrimination based on sex in the context of housing. Hopefully, future precedent will take into account developed law from the employment context and considerations unique to
housing. In Board of County Commissioners for Garfield County v. WH.,
Inc.,2 11 the court correctly applied doctrine from state law to find that a
road was obtained by the public using adverse possession. Although the
doctrine of dedication would have provided a quicker, surer way to accomplish the same result, the parties failed to plead the doctrine.
David G. Thatcher

209. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
210. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
211. 992 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1993).

